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CERCLA and the Abrogation of 
State Sovereign Immunity 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the inception of our nation, the most serious threats 
to the rights of the people have come when legislators and 
judges have considered the country to be pressed with problems 
so great as to require "creative interpretation" of our 
constitutional rights. Today, the most urgent problems facing 
our nation are the imminent dangers threatening the natural 
environment in which we live. 
Since the 1960's, Congress has passed act after act placing 
increasingly restrictive standards and controls on the way we 
treat our environment. These standards frequently collide 
head-on with the guaranteed freedoms we thought were 
secured by the Constitution. The Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA)1 and the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)2 constitute a very broad 
response to environmental dangers. CERCLA conflicts with the 
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. In Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co.,3 the U.S. Supreme Court's plurality decision 
reopened the old wounds of the struggle between two opposing 
theories of the Eleventh Amendment. 
The Court must settle this interpretive battle in order to 
return stability to Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Will 
the Eleventh Amendment or other constitutional provisions be 
able to check the sweeping effects of environmental legislation 
on the rights of the people and states? Or, will the urgent 
needs of the times continue to change the way we interpret our 
Constitution? 
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
2. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (codified in various 
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 960r-9675). 
3. 491 u.s. 1 (1989). 
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
For several hundred years the Supreme Court has 
struggled over the question of state sovereign immunity. Such 
a struggle is perhaps inevitable in our unique system of 
federalism which attempts to balance the power of each 
sovereign state with the sovereign power of the federal 
government. Ratification of the Constitution made it clear that 
the sovereign status of the states would be diminished, 
reducing them to subsidiary sovereigns, while ultimate 
authority would rest in the strong centralized national 
sovereign. 
The subservient status of the states toward the federal 
government was not at first seen as a barrier to state sovereign 
immunity. It was not until the Supreme Court began to 
interpret Article III of the Constitution as an abrogation of 
sovereign immunity that the debate became heated.4 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated with the 
English courts at least as early as the thirteenth century. 5 The 
doctrine was transplanted to America by the early colonists 
and adopted by the several states after the revolution. By the 
time the Constitution was ratified, the idea of state sovereign 
immunity was widely accepted6 but not universaV Early 
American rejections of the doctrine were contained in colonial 
charters which expressly gave citizens the right to sue their 
colonial governments.8 Probably the most widely held view of 
state sovereign immunity after the revolution was that 
immunity existed unless a state gave its consent to be sued.9 
The most serious problem facing the future of the doctrine 
of state sovereign immunity has been its apparent clash with 
Article III of the Constitution. Article III established the basis 
4. See Letitia A. Sears, Comment, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas: Congressional 
Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Under the Commerce Clause, or, Living 
With Hans, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 513, 515-16 (1989). 
5. See 9 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A History of English Law 8 (3d ed. 1944). 
6. Sovereign immunity was widely accepted throughout the American colonies 
primarily due to the circulation of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND. SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDMUND BURKE 126-27 (W. J. Bate ed. 1960). 
7. Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 89 (1989). 
8. ld; see also 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 
16, 19 (William F. Swindler ed. 1975). 
9. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526-27 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1836). 
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for federal jurisdiction over the states in a number of 
situations. For example, federal jurisdiction exists when there 
is a controversy "between a State and citizens of another 
State . . . or foreign . . . citizens or Subjects."10 The 
inconsistency between state sovereign immunity and Article III 
has been the subject of much debate among constitutional 
scholars. Traditionally, two opposing explanations of Article III 
have been propounded. 
Opponents of sovereign immunity usually characterize 
Article III as expressing a clear intent to abrogate any notion 
of state sovereign immunity that may have existed at the time 
of ratification. Supporters of sovereign immunity see Article III 
as merely expressing a statement of available federal 
jurisdiction to be considered only in light of the existing 
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Another explanation of 
Article III is that it is merely an attempt to give the federal 
judiciary jurisdiction limited to those cases in which the state 
is a plaintiff against a private citizen. Despite numerous 
appeals to the history by both sides, no definitive explanation 
of the intent behind Article III has arisen. 
A. Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment 
The debate over the meaning of Article III eventually cul-
minated in the Supreme Court's controversial decision in 
Chisholm v. Georgia. 11 The Court in Chisholm held that, in 
light of express provisions in the Constitution, particularly 
Article Ill, a state could be sued in federal court by a citizen of 
another state.12 Several of the Justices in Chisholm explained 
that by virtue of having joined the federal union, states had 
consented to be sued by private citizens in federal court be-
cause of the supremacy of the federal government over the 
states. 13 Only Justice Cushing found that the states' immuni-
ty had been specifically abrogated by Article III. 14 
The decision in Chisholm caused such a furor that Con-
gress began working within days to construct a constitutional 
amendment reversing the effects of the decision.15 As a result 
10. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2. 
11. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
12. !d. 
13. !d. at 464-65. 
14. !d. at 467 (Cushing, J., concurring). 
15. John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of 
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of their efforts, the Eleventh Amendment was drafted, over-
whelmingly ratified, and put into effect by January 8, 1798. 16 
Traditionally, two explanations have been proffered for the 
widespread support the Eleventh Amendment received in Con-
gress after the Chisholm decision. One common explanation 
points out that the states were under a heavy burden of debt 
from foreign creditors and desired to default on those debts 
without suffering any consequence. 17 The second explanation 
is simply that there was an overwhelming understanding 
among the framers of the Constitution that the states were 
intended to be immune from citizen's s~its. 18 These differing 
explanations form the basis for the current schisms in modern 
Eleventh Amendment debate. Regardless of Congress' attempt 
to settle the sovereign immunity question, the Eleventh 
Amendment may have caused more confusion over states' sov-
ereign immunity than did the Chisholm decision. 
B. The Eleventh Amendment 
The Eleventh Amendment states that: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of 
another State, or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign 
State. 19 
Although the wording of the amendment seems clear, it leaves 
open several questions concerning state immunity. The answers 
to such questions turn on what one sees as the intended pur-
pose in passing the amendment. 
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment is not a full asser-
tion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It simply defines a 
narrow set of circumstances in which suits against the states 
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1436 (1975). 
16. See Peter N. Swan, The Eleventh Amendment Revisited: Suits Against State 
Government Entities and Their Employees in Federal Courts, 14 J. COLL. & U.L. 1, 
3 (1987). 
17. Louise L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign lmmuni· 
ty, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1963); see also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge 
Comm'n., 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933). 
18. See CHARLES G. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
GoVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835 at 138 (1944); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 
134 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1890). 
19. U.S. CaNST. amend XI. 
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cannot be heard in federal court. The amendment makes no 
mention of suits by a state's own citizens or by the federal gov-
ernment. Accordingly, post-amendment debate has centered on 
whether the Eleventh Amendment was created (1) for the pur-
pose of constitutionalizing the common law doctrine of sover-
eign immunity or (2) to eliminate a narrow class of suits be-
tween a state and a citizen of another state. Wranglings over 
the breadth and limits of the Eleventh Amendment focus upon 
these two questions. The faction which supports the notion that 
the Eleventh Amendment establishes the traditional notions of 
state sovereign immunity is called the "conventionalist" fac-
tion. 20 The faction which supports the theory that the 
Eleventh Amendment should be narrowly interpreted has come 
to be called the "revisionist" faction. 21 
C. The Rule in Hans v.Louisiana 
Part of the debate concerning wrangling about the scope of 
the Eleventh Amendment was settled by the Supreme Court in 
Hans u. Louisiana. 22 The decision in Hans expanded the 
Court's previous interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment23 
and "adopted the traditional view that the amendment was 
intended to correct the error of Chisholm" by codifying the 
doctrine of state sovereign immunity.24 Hans was a solid vic-
tory for the conventionalists. Today, Hans stands for the propo-
sition that Eleventh Amendment protection extends to suits by 
a state's own citizens as well as to those instituted by citizens 
of other states. Although Hans has been widely criticized by 
the revisionists as being wrongly decided,25 it has remained 
effectively in force si.pce it was handed down in 1890. 
20. See Charles J. Williamson, CERCLA, as Amended by SARA, Abrogates State 
Immunity Under the Eleventh Amendment Rendering States Liable for Money 
Damages in Federal Court, and Congress Has the Authority, Under the Commerce 
Clause, to Enact Such Legislation: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S.Ct 2273 
(1989), 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 723, 741 (1990). 
21. !d. 
22. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
23. Previously, the Court had more narrowly confined the meaning of the 
amendment to its literal wording. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 
316, 342 (1819). 
24. CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
110 (1972). 
25. See Sears, supra note 4, at 519-22. 
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D. Abrogation and Waiver of Immunity 
Although the Eleventh Amendment has survived numerous 
frontal assaults, the Court has created several exceptions 
which allow private parties to avoid the consequences of Hans 
and obtain relief from states in federal court.26 A state may 
waive its Eleventh Amendment protection by consenting to suit 
or Congress may abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states 
by statute under certain provisions of the Constitution. 
Waiver of sovereign immunity occurs when a state makes a 
voluntary appearance and defends itself on the merits of a case 
in federal court,27 when a state passes a statute expressing its 
consent to be sued,28 or when a state continues an activity 
after a federal statute is passed establishing a federal standard 
for that activity.29 
Congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment oc-
curs when Congress uses its superior power to override state 
immunity by passing a statute pursuant to one of its constitu-
tional sources of power. Traditional constitutional provisions 
under which the Supreme Court has recognized Congress' right 
to exercise its power of abrogation are the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,30 the Commerce Clause31 and possibly the Fifteenth 
Amendment.32 
This use of Congressional override, however, has been lim-
ited by the Court. It is not enough to show that a federal stat-
ute was passed under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Com-
merce Clause to prove Congress' intent to override the Elev-
enth Amendment. The Court has recently formulated a stan-
dard which must be met in order to find that a federal statute 
abrogates the Eleventh Amendment. In Atascadero State Hosp. 
v. Scanlon,33 the Court held that in order to override state 
26. The additional remedy of seeking redress from state officers is not dis-
cussed within the scope of this paper. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
27. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). But see Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U.S. 651 (1974) (a state that has defended and lost on the merits may raise 
an Eleventh Amendment defense on appeal). 
28. See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). 
29. This type of waiver, however, may have been severely limited if not com-
pletely abolished. See Welch v. State Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 
468, 477 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
30. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
31. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
32. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
33. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
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sovereign immunity, "Congress may abrogate the States' con-
stitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only 
by making his intention unmistakably clear in the language of 
the statute."34 This standard has rarely been met. 
The Court has refused to find a clear abrogation of the 
Eleventh Amendment under section 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act,35 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,36 the Education to the 
Handicapped Act,37 and the Bankruptcy Code.38 However, 
the Court has found a clear abrogation of the Eleventh 
Amendment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,39 
and more recently, under the SARA amendments of 
CERCLA.40 This recent finding of the Court makes the 
CERCLA statute of more imminent concern to the states. 
III. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF CERCLA 
AND THE SARA AMENDMENTS 
In 1980, CERCLA was enacted by Congress to address 
some of the deficiencies in the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976 (RCRA).41 The RCRA was concerned with 
protecting the environment from the disposal of hazardous 
substances.42 Among the problems CERCLA was intended to 
address was the need to provide a retroactive remedy for inac-
tive hazardous waste disposal sites.43 A recurring difficulty 
with the cleanup of hazardous materials under previous law 
was the fact that some of the most dangerous threats to the 
welfare of the environment were created years ago when large 
quantities of hazardous materials were left behind by now de-
funct companies. Furthermore, many of the properties on which 
the hazardous materials are located have passed through sever-
al hands with the current owners having little knowledge of or 
34. !d. at 242. 
35. See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
36. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234. 
37. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). 
38. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 
96 (1989). 
39. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
40. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1. 
41. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 
(1988). 
42. James K. Floyd, Note, Piercing the Veil of Sovereign Immunity: Holding 
States Liable in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 35 S.D.L. REV. 341, 344-45 (1990). 
43. See H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. 
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culpability in the storage or disposal of the materials. 
CERCLA certainly appeared to resolve the problem of ret-
roactive application,44 but the statute was plagued by other 
deficiencies which limited its effectiveness.45 In 1986, Con-
gress passed the SARA amendments to CERCLA in order to 
cure some of the statute's shortcomings by: (1) adding $8.5 bil-
lion46 to the Superfund;47 (2) allowing EPA to settle with re-
sponsible parties;48 and (3) allowing liable parties to seek con-
tribution from other responsible parties.49 In addition, 
CERCLA was changed in ways that may not have been obvious 
until the Supreme Court's decision in Union Gas.50 
A. Liability of Persons as Owners or Operators 
Central to the issue of state immunity under CERCLA is 
the question of who qualifies as a "person" or as an "owner or 
operator". Joint and several liability under CERCLA has been 
strictly imposed upon persons who are or were owners or oper-
ators of hazardous waste vessels or facilities. Recently, the 
Supreme Court has based its decisions about application of tha. 
Eleventh Amendment on the issue of whether or not state gov-
ernments are specifically included in these terms. If states are 
"persons" or "owners or operators" under the statute then they 
may be subject to potentially devastating liability. 
It is apparent from CERCLA itself that strict liability, at 
the very least, is implied by section 9607(a)(1). Section 
9607(a)(1) states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and sub-
ject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this 
section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
44. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 85R F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 
1988)("Congress intended CERCLA's liability provisions to apply retroactively to 
pre-enactment disposal activities."); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical 
& Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986)("The statutory scheme itself is 
overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive."); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 
681 F. Supp. 1492, 1495 (D. Utah 1987)("CERCLA is meant to be both remedial 
and retroactive."). 
45. H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2836, 2837. 
46. The original allotment was $1.6 billion. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(1980). 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9611. 
48. !d. § 9622. 
49. !d. § 9613(0. 
50. Union Gas, 409 U.S. 1. 
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(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of, 
465 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise 
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a trans-
porter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous 
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other 
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or 
operated by another party or entity and containing such haz-
ardous substances, and 
( 4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, 
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from 
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes 
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, 
shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action .... 51 
The defenses referred to are limited to the following: 
(1) an act of God; 
(2) an act of war; 
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee 
or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission 
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship . . . if 
(defendant) (a) exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous substance concerned, taking into consideration the char-
acteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all rele-
vant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions 
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party 
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such 
acts or omissions .... 52 
Courts have been more zealous than even the statute itself 
in holding parties strictly liable for CERCLA violations. In New 
York v. Shore Realty Corp., the court held: 
Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly 
liable, even though an explicit provision for strict liability was 
not included in the compromise. Section 9601(32) provides 
that 'liability' under CERCLA 'shall be construed to be the 
standard of liability' under section 311 of the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, which courts have held to be strict lia-
bility .... 53 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
52. !d. § 9607(b). 
53. 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2nd Cir. 1985) (citing Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied 
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In United States v. Hooker Chemicals. & Plastics Corp.,54 
the court imposed joint and several liability but stated that a 
party could show that the harm was divisible.55 From the ex-
press provisions of CERCLA as well as from the federal court 
decisions one can conclude that any "person" who can be classi-
fied as an owner or operator is potentially under a great bur-
den of liability, and thus, even greater weight is placed upon 
how the courts and the statute define the terms "person" or 
"owner or operator," and specifically, whether states are includ-
ed in those terms. 
B. The SARA Amendments 
Of the major achievements of the SARA amendments, two 
have adversely affected states' sovereign immunity. The first is 
in the expanded definitions that expressly and impliedly in-
clude states as potentially liable parties for hazardous waste 
violations. The second is the added provision which allows for 
citizens suits. 
1. SARA's new definitions 
SARA's first significant expansion was an express inclusion 
of states in its definition of "persons". Section 101(21) provides: 
The term "person" means an individual, firm, corporation, 
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commer-
cial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, 
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate 
body.56 
SARA also impliedly included states when it defines an "owner 
or operator" as "a 'person' who engages in certain activities."57 
Thus, if a state is engaged in certain illegal activities, described 
by the SARA amendments, it could be held liable for damages. 
The SARA amendments also contain an exclusion for states 
Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979). 
54. 680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). 
55. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983) 
(If there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the divisibility of the harm 
and any potential apportionment, the defendants are not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.) 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (emphasis added). 
57. Floyd, supra, note 42 at 347; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). 
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which applies in certain circumstances, but the wording of the 
exclusion probably does more harm than good to state immuni-
ty. The exclusion provides that: 
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State 
or local government which acquired ownership or control 
involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandon-
ment, or other circumstances in which the government in-
voluntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as a sover-
eign.ss 
But the exclusion does not apply where the state "has caused 
or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance from (a) facility, ... "59 
Further, the SARA exclusion for states contains a clause 
which potentially destroys any state immunity that may have 
been retained in other parts of the statute. Section 101(20) 
specifies that a state "shall be subject to the provisions of this 
I 
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both pro-
cedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, 
including liability under section 9607 of this title."60 Thus, 
under this section a state could be subject to actions in federal 
court just like any other private or governmental party. 
2. The citizen suit provision 
In addition to the inclusion of states as potentially liable 
parties, SARA's provision for citizen's suits represents a formi-
dable attack on state sovereign immunity. It is one thing to 
allow the federal government to take legal action against states 
for violations of federal law under CERCLA;61 it is quite an-
other to allow private citizens to sue the state in direct con-
tradiction to the express provision of the Eleventh Amendment 
and the Court's pronouncement in Hans. 
The failure to provide for citizen's suits for contribution 
was considered to be one of the great deficiencies in the origi-
nal CERCLA statute.62 The SARA amendments attempted to 
58. 42 u.s.c. § 9601(20)(D). 
59. !d. 
60. ld. (emphasis added). 
61. The nature of federalism and the preemptive powers of the national sover-
eign demand that at least the federal government have the power to initiate 
judicial action against a state in federal court. 
62. Floyd, supra note 42. 
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remedy this by enacting section 310.63 Section 310 provides 
that any person may commence a citizen's suit "against any 
person (including the United States and any other governmen-
tal instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the 
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) . . . in violation of 
any . . . regulation."64 It is interesting to note that the clause 
which most clearly abrogates the Eleventh Amendment cites 
the amendment as its only limitation. 
As yet, it is unclear how section 310 will be interpreted by 
the courts, but it can only be understood if the reference to the 
Eleventh Amendment is viewed as only applying to this section 
and not to suits by persons provided for by other sections of 
CERCLA. Some argue that section 310 is limited to suits for 
injunctive relief only, but the fact that the Eleventh Amend-
ment is invoked in this section and not in the others is evi-
dence that Congress considered the Eleventh Amendment as 
having been abrogated by the other provisions of CERCLA. 
Thus, Congress felt it necessary to invoke it as a limit to this 
section only.65 
IV. PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS Co. 
A. Facts 
In 1980, the EPA and the State of Pennsylvania began 
efforts to clean up what became the first emergency Superfund 
site listed in the United States under the CERCLA guide-
lines.66 For nearly 50 years the predecessors of Union Gas67 
operated a coal gasification plant near Brodhead Creek in 
Straudsberg, Pennsylvania.68 As a byproduct of its main oper-
ations the plant produced large amounts of coal tar which were 
deposited on top of, and injected into, the soil surrounding the 
plant.69 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9659. 
64. ld. (emphasis added). 
65. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 10. 
66. ld. at 5. 
67. Union Gas Co. acquired the property by merger in 1978. Note, Look Out 
States . . . Your Environmental Liability Could Be Bigger than You Think, 30 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 929 (1990). 
68. ld. 
69. ld. The predecessor plant's use of in-ground disposal of coal tar was consid-
ered state-of-the-art technology of that time. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct 2273 
(1989) (No. 87-1241). 
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Years after the plant shut down and the property had 
changed hands, the State of Pennsylvania, together with the 
Borough of Stroudsburg and the Army Corps of Engineers, 
began excavating on the property as part of a flood control 
project along Brodhead Creek.70 While excavating, the state 
disturbed the deposits of coal tar causing them to seep into 
Brodhead Creek.71 Upon notification of the seepage, the EPA 
declared the coal tar a hazardous substance72 and ordered 
that the site be cleaned. 73 The state and federal government 
completed cleanup of the Broadhead Creek site at a final cost 
of $1.4 million. 74 Eventually, the United States reimbursed 
Pennsylvania for the federal share of the cleanup expenses. 
The United States then filed a lawsuit against Union Gas to 
recover its expenditures pursuant to sections 104 and 106 of 
CERCLA.75 as well as other environmental statutes.76 Union 
Gas, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the State of 
Pennsylvania, ~laiming that the state was liable as an "owner 
or operator" under CERCLA. 77 The district court dismissed 
the claim against Pennsylvania based on the bar of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. 78 The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme 
Court vacated the decision and remanded the case for consider-
ation in light of the new SARA amendments which Congress 
had passed while the parties waited for the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari.79 
Upon remand, the Third Circuit held that in light of the 
new SARA amendments, the states had been made liable to 
private parties in suits under CERCLA and the SARA 
amendments created an unambiguous abrogation of state sov-
ereign immunity granted by the Eleventh Amendment. In a 
plurality decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Cir-
cuit decision.80 
70. United States v. Union Gas, 792 F.2d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 1986). 
71. ld. 
72. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14). 
73. United States v. Union Gas, 792 F.2d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 1986). 
74. ld. at 375. 
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606. 
76. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6. 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
78. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6. 
79. Id. 
80. ld. 
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B. Analysis 
The decision in Union Gas was very fragmented with the 
Court issuing five different opinions. The judgment of the 
Court was announced by Justice Brennan who was joined by 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. According to Justice 
Brennan, there were two questions necessary for the Court to 
decide: (1) "whether CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly 
expresses an intent to hold States liable in damages for conduct 
described in the statute";81 and (2) "whether Congress pos-
sesses the . . . power of abrogation under the Commerce 
Clause .... "82 
1. Brennan's opinion 
In his decision on the abrogation question, Brennan pre-
sented a three-pronged argument that began with an analysis 
of CERCLA's definitions of "persons" and "owners or operators" 
as well as the exclusion for states in certain situations. He 
came to the conclusion that: 
The express inclusion of States within the statute's definition 
of "persons," and the plain statement that States are to be 
considered "owners or operators" in all but very narrow cir-
cumstances, together convey a message of unmistakable clari-
ty: Congress intended that States be liable al6ng with every-
one else for cleanup costs recoverable under CERCLA. 83 
Further, Brennan recognized that although the statute allows 
for express exclusions of states as potentially liable parties in 
certain circumstances, the only express exclusion, section 
101(20)(D), did not apply under the circumstances of the 
case.84 
Brennan next turned to several sections in the statute that 
indirectly support the notion that Congress intended that 
states be held liable under CERCLA. According to Brennan, the 
fact that Congress supplied an exception to a state's general 
liability under sections 101(20)(D) and 107(d)(2) was "explicit 
recognition of the potential liability of States under this stat-
81. !d. at 5. 
82. !d. 
83. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 8. 
84. !d. 
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ute .... "85 In other words, if states were not already liable 
under other CERCLA provisions, there would be no need for 
the specific exemptions. 
Brennan's third argument was that "in § 101(20)(D), Con-
gress used language virtually identical to that it chose in waiv-
ing the Federal Government's immunity from suits for damages 
under CERCLA."86 This mirroring of the "unequivocal expres-
sion" of the waiver of federal sovereign immunity with that of 
the states was further evidence of a congressional intention to 
override state immunity.87 Thus, the language of the waiver of 
the United States sovereign immunity became the language of 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 
Brennan's response to the question whether Congress actu-
ally has power, under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment was little more than a restatement of a 
long line of cases decided by the Court recognizing that pow-
er.88 Brennan answers that "every Court of Appeals to have 
reached this issue has concluded that Congress has the author-
ity to abrogate States' immunity from suit when legislating 
pursuant to the plenary powers granted it by the Constitu-
tion."89 In this case, it was the familiar power of the Com-
merce Clause. 
2. Stevens' concurring opinion 
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, gave a scathing 
reply to the conventionalist view of the Eleventh Amendment 
expressed in Hans. 90 According to his belief, Hans was wrong-
ly decided, and the Eleventh Amendment has never embodied a 
general grant of sovereign immunity to the states.91 There-
fore, there is no need to find, nor indeed, can there be any 
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment. The prohibition 
against a state's own citizens suing it in federal court was 
85. !d. 
86. !d. at 10; see 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1). 
87. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1. 
88. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); 
Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973); 
Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987); 
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation for New York State, 470 U.S. 226, 252 
(1985); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). 
89. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15. 
90. !d. at 23. 
91. !d. at 23-25. 
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merely a judge-made rule and can be undone by judges without 
reference to the Eleventh Amendment.92 This, of course, is the 
unadulterated revisionist view of the Eleventh Amendment. 
3. White's dissent 
Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion in Union Gas. 
In the first part White concluded that there was no "unmistak-
ably clear language" in CERCLA or SARA to override the Elev-
enth Amendment.93 White drew support for his opinion from 
the fact that many of the appellate courts found that the 
CERCLA provisions cited by Brennan did not express a clear 
abrogation of state immunity.94 It stands to reason that if so 
many judges were mistaken on that issue then the declarations 
in CERCLA involving the Eleventh Amendment could not be 
"unmistakable". 
White bases his second argument on the fact that Congress 
also included the United States in its definition of the term 
"person," yet found it necessary to include a separate section 
detailing the waiver of immunity for the federal government.95 
If the inclusion of the United States in the definition of the 
term "person" was enough to waive sovereign immunity, why 
was the additional provision necessary? The fact that there was 
no like provision in CERCLA detailing the abrogation of state 
immunity is evidence that there was no such intent on the part 
of Congress. 96 
White's third argument was simply that any authority 
given by CERCLA over the states relates only to actions , 
brought by the federal government and not to those brought by 
private citizens.97 Concerning the language of CERCLA, White 
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor 
and Kennedy. With the balance of White's dissent these justic-
es concurred in part and dissented in part. 
In the second half of White's dissent, he agreed with 
Brennan that Congress has the power under the Commerce 
Clause to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, though he dis-
agreed with Brennan's reasoning. Justice Scalia filed a sepa-
92. !d. 
93. !d. at 45. 
94. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 46-47. 
95. !d. at 47-48. 
96. !d. 
97. !d. at 48-49. 
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rate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He too, 
was joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy. 
The mishmash of opinions in Union Gas is indicative of the 
state of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity in the Court 
today. The decision was a victory for the revisionists, but is it a 
firm, lasting victory? 
C. The Effects of Union Gas 
The most immediate and significant effect of the decision 
in Union Gas was the unrestrained introduction of broad liabil-
ity for states under CERCLA and perhaps other environmental 
statutes. Of course, the decision has similar implications for 
other potentially liable parties. According to Brennan, "every-
one who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contam-
ination may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup."98 
According to Stevens, "Congress has decided that the federal 
interest in protecting the environment outweighs any counter-
vailing interest in not subjecting States to the possible award of 
monetary damages in a federal court."99 
In the process of giving expanded authority under the 
CERCLA statute, the Eleventh Amendment may have lost a 
great deal of its significance except as an historical artifact. 
Although the holding in Hans was not specifically overturned 
and the Eleventh Amendment was not attacked head-on, the 
Union Gas decision represented an end-run around the sover-
eign immunity doctrine. With Union Gas, the Court expanded 
the authority of Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment, negating any further need for direct attacks on the 
amendment. 
In the process of dodging the Eleventh Amendment, recent 
Court interpretations of CERCLA may have become too diffi-
cult for states to bear. States are not like most entities. They 
are funded through taxes, by people who generally have little 
control over how their bureaucracy functions and how their 
money is spent. It is this position of the states that encouraged 
Congress to adopt the Eleventh Amendment and the Supreme 
Court to create the doctrine in Hans. These efforts have now 
been thwarted in the effort to remedy what is considered to be 
98. !d. at 21. 
99. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added). 
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an immediate and serious threat to the environment. 
The Union Gas decision has been closely followed in almost 
every federal circuit. However, the ultimate position of the 
Court (in light of its recent move toward the right) may change. 
Union Gas does not represent a solid backing of a majority 
within the Court and could be resting on shaky ground. A more 
solid position of the Court may emerge within the next several 
years. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to the increasing awareness of the imminent dangers 
to the environment in which we live, Congress has passed in-
creasingly restrictive environmental statutes which have rekin-
dled old conflicts about the meaning and scope of the Eleventh 
Amendment and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. In 
the most recent round in that battle, the Supreme Court held 
that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, evidences a clear intent 
by Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment and allow 
citizen suits against states found in violation of the statute. In 
doing so, the Court signaled a victory for the revisionist faction 
in the battle over the Eleventh Amendment and has curbed the 
effectiveness of the Hans decision as a protection of states 
immunity. The victory for the revisionists may be short lived in 
light of the splintered opinion of the Court in Union Gas. A 
majority of the Court has yet to solidify a more secure position 
on the Eleventh Amendment issue, and there is still hope that 
the states may not lose the few vestiges of sovereignty they 
have retained. 
I W. Shan Thompson 
